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ABSTRACT
DESANTIS, ANTHONY A. An Economic Analysis of the Rise in Franchise Values in
the Four Major North American Sports Leagues From 2008-2016.
Department of Economics, March 2018.
ADVISOR: Stephen J. Schmidt
North American professional sports franchise values have been growing rapidly
over the last 10 years, leading some to wonder how this rise might mirror previous
economic booms such as those of the internet and housing sectors, and thus impact the
future of the sport industry. To investigate this phenomenon, financial and other teamspecific data was acquired from Forbes, while metropolitan area statistics were mostly
gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census. The results of this
study showed that revenue, metropolitan area population and GDP, multiple teams in the
same metro area and the same league, and year that a venue opened (or was renovated)
have a significant effect on team value. Additionally, a large “bubble” in team prices for
2016 was evident throughout, helping explain the drastic rise in prices since 2014.
Revenue, metroGDP, and year=2016 were all positively correlated with franchise value,
while metroteamssame, metropop, and venueyropened were all negatively correlated Since
professional sports is a private industry, the bubble is most likely driven by external factors
such as the rise in TV and broadcasting revenue, and thus does not seem to be in danger of
bursting. As such, it will be interesting to see how new TV deals increase these valuations
even further. Additionally, one can theorize how recent and forthcoming sales transactions
might continue to “set the market” higher and higher, as typically occurs in other industries
throughout the economy.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Section 1.1: Research Question and Answer
This paper aims to prove how market demographics like metropolitan area income
and population, and financial statistics such as revenue and player expenses can be
determinants of the rise in North American professional sports franchise values over the
last 10 years.
As the analysis below will show, a franchise’s revenue, the population and GDP of
the metropolitan area in which it plays, having more than one team from the same league
in the same metro area, and the year in which a team’s venue opened are the factors that
are statistically significant and correlated to its overall rise in value over the last 10 years.
Even though revenue prevails as the primary factor causing the large rise in value over this
time period, it is not large enough to explain the drastic spike in values more specifically
between 2014-2016. Even after controlling for revenue, team valuations in 2016 are still
$312 million higher than they would have been with the same revenue and other factors in
earlier years. As such, these findings support the idea that an economic bubble might be
present in the sports industry, with values far exceeding their true expected range. Given
this information, along with the theory that the bubble is most likely driven by external
factors such as TV and broadcasting revenue and ever-climbing real transaction prices, it
can be expected that these values continue to rise exponentially in the near future.
Section 1.2: Research Motives
Sports economics has commanded a greater share of attention from economists
around the world since the early 1990s, and even more so over the past 15-20 years. While
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topics have ranged from the impact of free agency to labor issues to team nomenclature,
one specific area of interest that has yet to be fully developed is the impact of factors such
as costs, revenue, and metropolitan demographics on a franchise’s estimated value. This
topic has come into even greater focus over the last decade as team values across the four
major North American sports leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA, NHL) have skyrocketed, with
little economic reasoning or theory to explain such a drastic rise. Forbes has estimated
these franchise values using its own formulas and economic data, providing further
evidence behind this growing trend. Additionally, over this same time period real
transaction prices for teams throughout the four leagues have increased exponentially as
well, most times even exceeding the estimated value as calculated by Forbes.
This phenomenon is especially interesting to study as the sports industry has shown
fluctuations in value in response to various economic factors and events as well. Some
team values decreased between 2008-2012 as the U.S. endured The Great Recession and
subsequent long period of recovery. On the other end of the spectrum, the largest increase
in franchise values has occurred since 2014 – the same time during which the economy has
boomed and the stock market has flourished. These similar trends between the U.S.
macroeconomy and the sports industry might suggest a greater correlation between a firm’s
finances and its overall value than previously thought, as well as provide the potential
underlying theory of an economic bubble that franchises have witnessed more recently, as
seen during the technology boom of the late-1990s and the housing bubble of the mid2000s.
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CHAPTER TWO
BCKGROUND ON THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS INDUSTRY
Section 2.1: Overview of North American Professional Sports History
With a rise in popularity and the growing importance of sports economics and
sports money, the North American professional sports industry has become increasingly
more interesting to study in the last 20-30 years. Unlike publicly traded companies, sports
franchises are almost all completely privately owned (with the exception of the Green Bay
Packers – whose public offerings occur very rarely and come with almost none of the
benefits of owning traditional stock). However, these franchises operate much in the same
ways that public companies operate, with values ultimately derived from the return on
capital investment in them, among many other factors. As such, changes in value are often
reflected by stock market swings, and other economic, political, and social events that
shock the economy. The sports industry survived The Great Depression, and more recently
the impact that The Great Recession had on sponsorship and attendance revenues to
continue on the path towards reaching the peak in value seen today (Van Riper, 2008). This
statement implies that the main factor that differentiates the professional sports industry
from many others is its ability to keep growing even in business cycle downturns. Even so,
while this privatized nature suggests that underlying factors must play a role in the overall
valuation, in the end a sports franchise is still a business like any other, and so the usual
tools of valuing businesses should apply to it in a similar sense.
The rest of this chapter will discuss the history of the four different professional
sports leagues in order to provide background knowledge on important events that have
fostered the development of each to reach where they are today. Part of this history acts as
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the foundation upon which these leagues have grown to become integral pieces of both
society and the economy. Without changes such as free agency, advertising revenue,
westward expansion, and many others, one could hypothesize that team values would never
have reached the heights they are at today. Additionally, more recent history provides the
motivation behind this paper, as evidence exists behind the idea that various factors have
contributed to the rapid rise in valuations. One specific piece of evidence that will be
studied in even greater detail is the potential formation of a “bubble” in the industry since
2014. Although the analytical portion of this study will group the four major North
American sports leagues into one for simplicity of regression analysis, it is easier to first
understand the growth of each league individually before then bringing all of these ideas
back together as it pertains to the model, results, and conclusion.
Section 2.2: History of Major League Baseball
Professional sports gained immense popularity in the United States and Canada
following World War II. During this same time period the current formation of the MLB,
NFL, NBA, and NHL slowly evolved as the leagues “progressively found ways to deal
with long-standing issues such as franchise relocations and nationwide expansion, conflict
with interlopers, limiting player salaries, racial integration, and many others that threatened
to hinder the expected growth” (Reiss, 2017). While Major League Baseball has long been
known as America’s pastime, this distinction has not come without scrutiny. Financial
woes were long a problem for many MLB teams, only to be resolved in the mid-20th
century with the game expanding to the West Coast, as well as aid from rapidly rising
attendance and the introduction of TV broadcasting (Reiss 2017).
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Along with this relocation and expansion came the construction of new ballparks.
In those early days, many teams secured public financing for these venues by claiming
them as multi-purpose venues, while more present-day stadiums embrace the look and feel
of the technological innovation revolution of today’s age that precedes increased private
financing and sole ownership. Additionally, the formation of the player’s union in 1954
was a moment that forever changed the course of baseball history, although its true impact
was not felt until the late 1960s and early 1970s by fighting for improved player benefits
and salaries, and eventually free agency (Reiss, 2017). No longer under the strict rules of
ownership, free agency is arguably the driving force behind the exponential rise in player
salaries that is seen today. Through multiple labor strikes and plateauing attendance, Major
Figure 1: Average MLB Team Valuation 2008-2016
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League Baseball has continued to grow in the 21st century due to higher ticket prices and
increased TV revenues, thanks in large part to arguably the strongest labor union in North
America. A more detailed representation of recent MLB team values that precedes the
regression analysis to follow can be seen in Figure 1 above, which shows average forecast
sales values since 2008. In particular, it is interesting to note the 59% average increase in
team value between 2014-2016, indicating the potential for some external factor affecting
these valuations beyond the measured variables that Forbes already uses in its calculation.
Section 2.3: History of the National Football League
Similar to Major League Baseball, the NFL made great strides in its national
appeal through westward expansion and merging with the American Football League.
Likewise, the formation of the NFL Players Association in 1956 eventually gave rise to
free agency, though unlike in MLB, with a hard salary cap that restricts player salaries to
a maximum dollar value (Reiss 2017). Many would argue that football has surpassed
baseball as America’s pastime as the NFL has the most teams of any professional league
and a growing fan base both domestically and internationally. Much of this growth into
the 21st century can also be attributed to league-wide TV and broadcast revenues – by far
the largest among any of the sports leagues. However, as the league seeks to continue to
thrive in the coming decades, it is challenged by two important matters: an increased
social divide between players and society, and the fallback of years of concussions and
other playing-related health issues that threaten the league’s profits, reputation, and
future. More recent trends in NFL estimated average team value can be seen in Figure 2
below, which shows a staggering 64% increase in value between 2014-2016 – exceeding
that of Major League Baseball teams over the same time period.

6

Figure 2: Average NFL Team Valuation 2008-2016

NFL Avg Franchise Values 2008-2016
2500

2338

Average Value ($M)

2000
1428

1500
1040

1107

1022

1000

500

0
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Year

*Data comes from Forbes
Section

2.4:

History

of

the

National

Basketball

Association

Basketball has a long-standing tradition throughout the United States and more
recently in Canada as well, though its popularity did not begin to rise until the NBA-ABA
merger in 1970 (Reiss 2017). Similar to the NFL and NBA, the initial growth of the sport
can be largely attributed to the formation of the player’s union, free agency, and nationwide
expansion. However, two main factors contributed to the late 1990s – early 2000s era of
prosperity: TV revenue sharing similar to the NFL, and the impact of Michael Jordan –
arguably the greatest and most influential athlete of all time – creating a brand and a culture
for future generations to follow and imitate. Since that time, NBA popularity has continued
to rise to rival that of the NFL and MLB, especially internationally where it has arguably
the second greatest appeal of the four major sports behind the NHL, and thus an immense
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Figure 3: Average NBA Team Valuation 2008-2016

NBA Avg Franchise Values 2008-2016
1400
1245
1200

Average Value ($M)

1000
800
634
600
400

372

393

367

200
0
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Year

*Data comes from Forbes
market for sustained growth for years to come. The impact of this rise in popularity on
NBA team values more recently can be seen in Figure 3 above. Similar to the two previous
graphs above, this graph also illustrates average team valuations over the ten-year time
period. Additionally, the trend of a large increase in team values since 2014 continues in
the NBA as well, though the 96% increase seen here far exceeds both the MLB and NFL.
Section 2.5: History of the National Hockey League
Unlike the three previous sports, historically hockey has a much bigger drawing
internationally than it does in the United States. The league was long known for its
“Original Six” franchises – the Boston Bruins, Chicago Blackhawks, Montreal Canadians,
New York Rangers, Detroit Red Wings, and Toronto Maple Leafs – who comprised the
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2016

entire league for nearly three decades (Reiss 2017). While the NHL has seen steady but
slow growth since, many external factors have caused it to lag behind other North
American professional sports leagues. Since many of its players immigrate from overseas
countries, the NHL has had to embrace this diversity by conforming to Olympic and other
national team demands, which typically fall in the middle of the season.
Additionally, a lack of union structure hindered growth during the late 20th century
– a time when other leagues prospered. During this same time period relocation and
expansion were abundant, but with little success – especially in the southern part of the
U.S, a warmer climate with minimal hockey appeal and a history deeply rooted in the other
three leagues. Lacking the same national engagement of the other three sports, the NHL
Figure 4: Average NHL Team Valuation 2008-2016
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clearly trails the MLB NFL, and NBA in terms of current popularity and growth as
evidenced by average franchise values over the last 10 years seen in Figure 4 above. This
is especially true considering NHL teams did not exhibit the same trend of drastic growth
since 2014 with only an 11% value gain on average, compared to the 59%, 64%, and 96%
seen in the MLB, NFL, and NBA respectively. Whatever factors may be driving the growth
in the other three leagues do not seem to be having the same effect in the National Hockey
League, which supports the theory that each league operates independently and reacts
differently than the others.
Section 2.6: Current and Future Sports Market Data
As of 2014, Forbes valued the current North American professional sports market
at $60.5 billion, with it expected to reach $73.5 billion by 2019 (Heitner, 2015). Along
these same lines, it is expected that revenue from media rights deals – especially in the
NBA, NHL, and NBA where current contracts expire in 2019 – will surpass gate revenues
as the industry’s largest income segment. The underlying economics here is that franchise
values should rise when they receive more TV revenue, under the assumption that revenue
shows as significant and positively correlated with team value.
The accompanying sports market history and projections that previously supported
this position can be seen in Figure 5 below. The largest increases in market-associated
revenue between 2010-2014 occurred in both media rights and sponsorship, with gate
revenues and merchandising trailing slightly behind in terms of gains. In particular, media
rights climbed 15.2% from 2010-20111, and 19% between 2013-20142. The 2015-2019
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NFL signed TV deals worth $27 billion, and NHL new 10 year deal, in 2011.
NBA signed new $24 billion deal with Turner in 2014, expected to begin during 201617 season
2
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Figure 5: North American Sports Market History and Projections

projections support the current data to continue this trend as well, with projected CAGR
returns of 7.2% and 4.5% for media rights and sponsorship respectively. Expected yearover-year changes for this same time period remain relatively steady as well, with media
rights expected to fall to more normalized levels after the jump associated with the latest
NBA television deal. Given these rapid changes along with the overall evolution of the
sports industry, there is great anticipation about how this continued growth nationally will
contribute to the paralleled rise in franchise valuation.
Section 2.7: Theory of an Economic Bubble
As seen with the rapid rise of estimated values between 2014-2016 in the NBA,
MLB, and NFL, evidence suggests that this increase might be explainable by the theory of
an economic bubble. An economic bubble can be defined as a rapid rise in the market prices
of an asset so far beyond its fundamental value that it can be considered an ‘irrational
exuberance’ (Investopedia 2017). In technical terms, a bubble occurs when there are too
many buyers who are too keen to buy and not enough supply, and thus prices get driven up
11

extremely quickly. This can especially be true in an industry such as professional sports in
which there is a minimal number of firms compared to a typical market, and these firms
are not sold very often. Additionally, the fact that teams are often sold through a closedbidding process pushes these prices up even further. Once one team sets the sale price high
in a particular sport, others are more likely to follow in the future.
Contemporary examples of an economic bubble support these assumptions. The
technology rise of the 1990s gave way to the dotcom bubble the formed and eventually
burst at the turn of the century as the economy could not handle the rapid rise in equity
markets fueled by investments in internet-based companies. The bubble formed as a result
of an influx of cheap money, easy capital, market overconfidence, and pure speculation.
However, the companies that investors hedged their bets on failed to turn a profit, and
eventually the market crashed as many of the companies declared bankruptcy and folded
(Investopedia, 2016). Even more recently, the housing bubble and subsequent Great
Recession in 2008 shook the economy in ways that economists had never seen before.
Partly fueled by the decreased investment in stocks following the dotcom bubble, investors
instead began purchasing real estate, driving up home prices across the country. However,
as time went on and prices continued to rise, these investments became more speculative
and the mortgages subprime until eventually homeowners defaulted, leaving banks and
institutions deprived of cash and capital (Investopedia 2017). What both of these events
have in common is the idea of speculative investment and greater demand than supply
rapidly increases prices – something that can be applied to many firms in many different
industries, even a professional sports team.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
The history of growth in the professional sports industry is especially interesting to
study as it relates to specific factors that may be affecting the exponential rise in franchise
valuation seen more recently – especially in the MLB, NBA, and NFL. Since these changes
cannot be attributed to specific macroeconomic variables or events, they must come from
other internal and external causes that are directly related to a specific franchise and its
corresponding market. Previous studies have sought to build upon this historical
knowledge by testing the correlation between many of these factors as it relates to the
increased franchise valuation across all four sports leagues. Much of this previous analysis
originally focused on the impact of facility construction and franchise relocation since it
was theoretically assumed throughout the industry that these factors increased the value of
a franchise and provided a positive externality to the surrounding city. Similarly, more
recent economists have further developed these ideas by questioning the importance of
team ownership, public vs. private funding of these new facilities, and the impact of
different pricing schemes, given that professional sports is a private industry and thus
financial statements are difficult to find. However, where this topic lacks analysis and
understanding – but provides an opportunity for additional research – is in this crossrelationship between underlying financials, market demographics, and franchise valuation,
and the potential economic reasoning behind both this rise in value as well as the decisionmaking determinants for potential investors in overvaluing a team during the bidding
process.
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Section 3.1: Real Transaction Price and Economic Models
One way in which economists have approached the topic of professional sports
franchise values is by looking at real transaction prices and how economic models can
predict such values. While these models are imperfect in determining specific factors that
may impact the sale price, they do a great job of examining the impact of the market
structure of the professional sports industry as a whole, especially as it pertains to various
microeconomic theories.
One of the distinct characteristics of a professional sports league compared to other
industries is the fact that there are industry-wide cooperative behaviors among teams with
some degree of antitrust exemption. Given this assumption, Bae and Choi (2007) analyzed
the optimal number of firms in a professional sports league using Salop’s circular city
model under two different assumptions. One assumption was a cartel with full collusion
that has absolute control over the number of firms as well as their pricing, and the other
was a semi-collusive cartel that controls the number of firms, but pricing is independently
determined by each firm in a non-cooperative manner. Although this study would not seem
to have a direct relationship to firm value, in a deeper sense the number of firms in a league
– or more specifically, in a single market – can potentially be a determining factor in overall
team value. As it relates to my study below, I have variables that measure competition
between franchises between firms and its effect on profits. However, in this scenario the
authors assumed that a professional sports league acts as the cartel that coordinates the
number of teams and possibly ticket pricing as well.
In modeling this cartel collusion, the authors used the location of consumers in the
circular city model as a representation of their fan loyalties for an ideal team. After
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analyzing this model under three scenarios: a cartel with full collusion, a semi-collusive
cartel without price control, and free entry, the authors found that each scenario had its own
advantages and drawbacks in relation to a professional sports league. The semi-collusive
cartel provided a smaller number of firms than the fully collusive cartel because the
inability to control prices forces it to relax price competition. As for North American sports
leagues, since they operate as a semi-collusive cartel, the number of franchises must come
close to the socially optimal number in order to maximize benefits for both the consumer
and the firm. However, this analysis also concluded by stating that any policy related to
the number of franchises should be evaluated with greater care because they depend on the
extent to which the leagues can control franchisees’ pricing behavior – an important note
for future studies on this topic. As it relates to overall franchise market value and the effect
of franchise location on this value, it is important to consider the number of teams in a
specific market – and even multiple teams from the same league in the same market – as
potentially correlated variables.
Due to the fact that financials of professional sports franchises are difficult to obtain
since they operate as private firms, Humphreys and Mondello (2008) aimed to predict the
determinants of franchise values using a Hedonic Price Model. A Hedonic Price Model
identifies factors according to the premise that price is determined both by internal
characteristics of the good being sold and external factors affecting it. The authors built off
of previous studies from the likes of Alexander and Kern (2004), Vine (2004), Fort (2006),
and Miller (2007), except with a further analysis of the impact of intangible assets and
fundamental determinants beyond the typical tangible ones such as stadiums and capital
resources.
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In this study the authors used the hedonic price index method to analyze the prices
paid for professional sports franchises based on their estimated value according to the
observable characteristics of their assets. The data for this study came from Rod Fort’s
Business Data website, BEA, and ballparks.com. However, compared to previous studies,
the authors here used actual franchise sale prices from the period 1969-2006 rather than
the estimated values given by Financial World and Forbes Magazine.
The results of this study indicated that the average price of NFL franchises is the
highest, followed by MLB and NBA which are equal, and NHL which are the lowest. It is
found that franchises in larger markets command a premium, while the population
parameter suggested that for each additional 1% increase in metro area population the
franchise sales price increases by 0.67%. Both of these ideas are ones that I will consider
in my analysis, though using the estimated value rather than actual sale prices during initial
regressions. For all sales since 1990, when Financial World started publishing estimated
team values, the estimated value averages $31.6 million less than the actual sale price.
While previous analysis would suggest that this difference stems from on-field success and
facility age, this hedonic price model does not support these findings. There also may be a
correlation between sale value and multiple franchises competing in the same study, though
further analysis of this variable must be done before reaching a conclusion. Lastly, the
average annual rate of increase of this index was over 20% for the period 1969-2006,
signifying owners earned significant capital gain over this period – and potentially a reason
why owners are willing to pay far above the estimated value. While the results of this
analysis were limited in scope since the hedonic price model depends critically on a
specified model and does not account for cross-league effects of changes in sale prices,
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these shortcomings also represent opportunities for further research on intangible variables
in the future.
As suggested at the end of his previous research on factors that affect actual sale
prices in professional sports, Humphreys and Lee (2010) aimed to price models on
franchise value by using the repeat sales method and a hybrid model that includes both
repeat sales and single transactions rather than a hedonic price model. Originally used for
calculating changes in the sales price of the same piece of real estate over time, the authors
used this method to instead analyze the change in franchise sales prices from one sale to
the next to account for the hedonic characteristics of franchise prices. The rationale behind
performing this research was to build upon previous theories of the effects of observable
variables such as transaction prices, markets teams play in, and facilities teams play, as
well as provide an offset for hedonic shortcomings in unobservable variables related to
perceived quality of a franchise due to reputation, city status, and other intangible benefits.
As with Humphreys’ previous study, data came from Rodney Fort’s Sports
Business Data website, though this time franchise sale prices were evaluated over the time
period 1960-2009. The results of this study showed some interesting features not seen in
previous studies. While the repeat sales method showed great fluctuation in the correlation
of sales prices on a year-to-year basis, over the long term there was no apparent upward
trend in the index. The trend line for this data rose incrementally over the first 30 years
before reaching a peak in the 1990s and then declining at the turn of the century. However,
when accounting for single sales in the hybrid model, an entirely different appeared. The
results of the hybrid model showed incremental increases over the first 30 years but then a
substantial increase in franchise values that began in the early 1990s and continued into the
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2000s. The only positively significant variable present in both of these models was
population.
In comparing both of Humphreys’ studies, it is important to note four possible
reasons for observed differences in prices between his hedonic, repeat sales, and hybrid
models: (1) some important characteristics of each franchise changed between transactions,
while the repeat sales method assumes these remain unchanged, (2) the prices of hedonic
attributes change over time, while the repeat sales approach holds them constant, (3) the
franchises that are bought and sold in the sample are not representative of the entire
population of franchises, and (4) the hedonic and hybrid approaches miss-specify the
functional form of the model and omit important hedonic characteristics.
As previously stated, the repeat sales method showed no significant upward trend
over time. Essentially, changes in the quality of individual franchises appear to drive
increases in the value of professional sports franchises. However, the upward trend –
especially in the 1990s and early 2000s – seen in the hybrid model suggested that the main
factors associated with franchise quality and value are market income and population,
facility characteristics, and on-field success. The difference in these results provides room
for further investigation into the effects of market-related factors, especially when
considering actual financials provided from Forbes rather than estimated prices using
theoretical economic models.
Section 3.2: Franchise Values Determined by Financial World and Forbes
Another way in which economists have approached this topic more recently is by
looking at the impact of various internal and external factors on a team’s value as calculated
by Financial World and Forbes. Since both companies began estimating team values at the

18

beginning of the 21st century, economists used this data, along with other factors readily
available to them such as relocation, venue data, team nomenclature, and other
metropolitan area statistics to estimate which factors were positively correlated with the
overall rise in team values.
Given the vast evolution and developments across the professional sports landscape
in the years and decades leading up their research, Alexander and Kern (2004) decided to
examine the effects of team nomenclature, team relocation, and new stadiums on franchise
values across the four major professional sports. In particular, the authors aimed to examine
the economic incentives motivating team relocation and new stadium construction from
the standpoint of managerial efficiency. They use a payoff strategy to determine the value
that each of these changes provides to the individual firm or team rather than the economy
as a whole.
In evaluating the effect that team nomenclature (whether a team takes the name of
its metropolitan area or its state) has on franchise value, Alexander and Kern treated each
of the four leagues separately since each has different rules and customs which may affect
that economic value. A major emphasis to support this distinction is revenue sharing –
whether through ticket sales, broadcast revenue, team luxury tax revenue sharing, or other.
An interesting feature found in collecting the data was that different teams in the same
location – and even in the same city – have adopted regional identities, such as teams from
Minnesota, Colorado, Tampa Bay, New Jersey, Florida, and others. In each of these
scenarios the reasons behind such a nomenclature can be explained from trying to
differentiate itself from another adjacent large city (New Jersey vs New York) or in smaller
market trying to capture fans from a larger radius (St. Paul vs Minnesota). There is also
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very little evidence of teams changing names while remaining in the same city, while
relocation or expansion presents an opportunity to change an identity and thus establish a
new fan base.
The empirical model used by Alexander and Kern consists of a pooled, crosssectional, time-series panel of team for teams from each of the four major professional
sports leagues from 1991-1997. Franchise value for each team acts as the dependent
variable, with data for these values coming from Financial World magazine. It is
interesting to note that the authors also compared the estimated value to the prices paid for
various franchises sold during this time period, and found that the estimates were typically
lower than the transaction prices – though this could reflect the “winners curse” in bidding
competition for a franchise (Scully, 1995). This economic theory is one of the drawbacks
of my own study because the estimated values from Forbes are not real sales values, and
they differ systematically. Continuing with this study, however, independent variables in
the model included: per-capita income, city population, previous season final standings,
regional identity, new facility or not (built in 1990 or later), change in franchise location,
change in team nomenclature, and expansion team.
The empirical results generally confirmed the author’s hypotheses. Market size,
team performance, and the presence of a new facility were all positively correlated to
franchise value. On the other hand, team relocation, new stadiums, and regional identities
had little-to-no effect on franchise values, though this can be attributed to increased costs
and revenues of such changes, as previously studied by Noll and Zimbalist (1997) and
Hamilton and Khan (1997). Two interesting ideas for future research that Alexander and
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Kern touch on only briefly is the interaction of regional identity with population, as well
as whether a regional vs. city identity has any effect on a franchise’s economic value.
Although various economists had studied the effects of stadium construction and
the type of financing involved on franchise values, Miller (2007) wanted to modernize this
analysis with a specific approach to Major League Baseball – a league in which many
teams drastically upgraded facilities at the turn of the 21st century. While many of these
past studies concluded that the benefits of the new stadium to both the team and the
surrounding market did not outweigh the construction and other external costs, the author
challenged these ideals with the hypothesis that a new stadium will increase the franchise
value of teams regardless of how construction was financed due to the increased value
involved with the capital investment.
Building off previous analysis, including that from Alexander and Kern (2004), this
study examined the effect of private financing for new stadiums on team franchise values
and measured the impact of the age of a team’s home stadium on its franchise value – a
more accurate measure of the “newness” of the facility. All of this helped explain the
determinants of franchise values and the lobbying efforts of team owners in seeking public
subsidies for construction. Independent variables tested for projected correlation with
market value included: metropolitan statistical area, per capita income, population (as
controls), winning percentage for current and previous year, and age stadium. The data for
this model, obtained from various sources for both ballpark and market information,
covered MLB teams during the period 1990-2002.
The empirical results of this model suggested that a 1% increase in population
increases team franchise values by between .09 and .12. In dollar terms, a team valued at
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$200,000,000 would see a $200,000 rise in value corresponding to this 15 increase in
population. Additionally, in regards to winning percentage, current year’s team quality is
more important in terms of franchise value growth than last year’s team quality. As far as
the impact of the stadium, a team playing in a brand-new stadium realizes an increase in
its franchise value. A team playing in its own stadium has a higher value than a team
playing in a public stadium, though the differences are not substantial enough to support
the increased costs of constructing a new private stadium. Also, a team playing in a
privately financed and owned stadium experiences an increase in value over time, while a
team playing in a publicly owned and financed stadium sees its value fall over time as the
stadium ages. While these results provide a good indication of whether or not a team will
finance the construction of a new stadium, it suggests that in determining the impact of
stadium construction on franchise values, private funding is the best alternative to public
funding or no funding at all in both the short- and long-run.
Building upon his previous research on private financing and franchise values in
Major League Baseball, Miller (2009) expanded this study to include specific variables
such as facility age and ownership on team franchise values. Given prior background
knowledge about the relationship between private firms and capital investments, the author
hypothesized that if a team owns its playing facility, it capitalizes the value of the facility
in the team franchise value, thus driving the value higher. This would back previous work
done by Alexander and Kern (2004) as well as by Miller (2007), while also supporting the
motives behind such investment projects and ownership decisions. The empirical model in
this analysis accounted for franchise valuation as it depended on variables such as winning
percentage for previous and current year, facility age, and ownership status of the facility,
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while controlling factors of population, income, and number of seasons in a city for other
external factors that could affect results.
The author found that local per-capita income was positively correlated with a rise
in franchise value, while population was not. Team quality mattered more in lower revenue
leagues such as the NBA and NHL than it did in the NFL. As for the initial hypothesis, the
author found evidence for facility capitalization in the MLB, NHL, and NFL but not in the
NBA. Economically speaking, it is more valuable for teams in each of those three leagues
to own its own stadium or facility in order to capitalize on the value it brings to the
franchise. This can have major implications on public vs. private financing of future
stadiums, the rate at which facilities are built, and the overall economic impact that a new
facility could have not only on the franchise valuation, but on the surrounding metro area
as well.
While much of the previous research and analysis on determinants of professional
sports firm values focused solely on North American teams, this study by Scelles et. al
(2013) pulled in the international aspect of European soccer as well. While the major
distinction between the North American sports industry and the European one is based on
private vs. public ownership, in recent years North American firms have begun to adopt
aspects of the European model of professional sports: a transition from the traditional to
the contemporary with less emphasis on gate receipts, subsidies, and sponsors, and greater
emphasis on vertical integration through a corporate structure that promotes maximizing
merchandising and TV revenues. The major question that the authors considered
throughout the analysis was: Does the comparison of the determinants of professional
sports firm values in North America and Europe contribute to a better understanding of the
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differences between American and European models? (Though inherently different, they
are slowly becoming ever-closer in both style and approach). In order to answer this
question, the authors used an empirical model and regression analysis with franchise value
as the independent variable and dependent variables such as city population and income,
facility age, and sports performance measured from 0-6 (not making playoffs to winning a
championship title). As with previous studies, data for this analysis came from Forbes,
BEA, Statistics Canada, Eurostat and Population Data, among others.
While the results from this regression indicated that franchise income had a
significantly positive impact for European soccer and not for any American sports, this can
also suggest that it is more important to be in a league that generates high revenues (and
thus high revenue sharing) than in an area where population incomes are high. Population
and attendance were positively significant throughout the four major North American
sports. Facility age was negatively correlated in the NFL and European soccer, not at all in
the NBA, and positively in MLB and the NHL – most likely due to historical value placed
on antique stadiums and ballparks. Private ownership was positively significant throughout
except for the NBA, while sports performance was positive in the NBA and soccer but
nowhere else. In all, there were major differences between the North American and
European sports industries except for private ownership and historical sports performance.
My study will specifically build on these earlier findings. While previous authors
estimated the impact of more qualitative variables such as team nomenclature, on-field
performance, and venue age on a franchise’s value, they did not have access to quantitative
data such as a team’s revenue, costs, and other market-related factors. As such, much of
this analysis will focus on how financial and numerical data – both within the team as well
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as within the metropolitan area market – may contribute to the recent rise in franchise
valuation, and how it might be a good indicator of the future of the professional sports
industry as a whole.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA
Section 4.1: Forbes Dataset
A majority of the data comes from Forbes, as the company provided five years’
worth of data on every team in each of the four major North American sports leagues. This
dataset includes many variables such as Forbes’s calculation of estimated team value, costs,
revenues, ticket sales, and more than fifteen other associated factors. Rather than receive
five consecutive years, such as 2012-2016, I instead use alternating years from 2008-2016.
Although this may cause a greater standard error over a broader range, I want greater
variance in the independent variables, which is more important to control for. Additionally,
with the exponential rise in valuation coming over the last decade, I thought it would be
more appropriate to analyze these factors according to this longer time period of increased
value – rather than just focus on the last five years – with the hope that it will provide a
more realistic depiction of economic and market trends, and thus better overall results.
Lastly, all of the variables that Forbes provided are fit with five years of data with the
exception of four: Debt-to-value %, Gate Receipts, Revenue per Fan, and Average ticket
price, which only have observations for 2016 because that is when the company started
collecting information on these variables, and thus they will not be included in any of the
regressions.
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Section 4.2: Forbes’s Value Determination
Forbes calculates this estimated team value using a cost-revenue analysis. Forbes
gathers this data from the teams, any public documents, sports bankers, credit rating
agencies, network executives, and media experts (Forbes Methodology, 2016). Revenue is
the value of the team based on current stadium deal3 without deduction for debt4. Operating
income is net of stadium revenues used for debt service. Additionally, revenue from nonsport events such as concerts or tours in included only when the revenue is pocketed by the
team owner or an entity the owner controls. The overall team value is then calculated as
the enterprise value5 based on the multiple of revenue of historical transactions, as well as
current offers to buy and invest in the teams. These values are then adjusted – to the extent
that the change in economics is understood and applicable – for teams moving into new
stadiums. Additionally, this valuation often coincides with the sum of four different
segments that are attributable to the franchise value: sport, market, stadium, and brand.
Sport is the portion of the franchise’s value attributable to revenue shared among all teams.
Market is the portion of franchise’s value attributable to its city and market size. Stadium
is the portion of a franchise’s value attributable to its stadium, and likewise brand is the
portion of a franchise’s value attributable to its brand.
Other variables that Forbes uses in estimating a team’s value also have specific
characteristics to take note of. EBIT is as economically defined – earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Debt/value includes stadium debts, player expenses
includes benefits and bonuses, and gate receipts includes club seats. Win-to-player cost

3

Unless a new stadium is pending
Other than annual stadium debt
5
Calculated as equity plus net debt
4
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ratio compares the number of wins per player payroll relative to the rest of the league.
Playoff wins count twice as much as regular season wins. A score of 120 means that the
team achieved 20% more victories per dollar of payroll compared with the league average
during the given season. Lastly, revenue per fan is calculated as local revenues divided by
metro population with populations in two-team markets divided in half, and the annualized
change is defined as the current team value compared with the latest transaction price.
Section 4.3: Other Data and Variables Collected
The rest of the data for this regression analysis comes from a variety of different
sources. Metropolitan area populations for all teams in the United States came from the
U.S. Census Bureau while populations for teams in Canada came from Statistics Canada.
Metropolitan area GDP for all U.S. teams was acquired from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. GDP data for Canadian teams was taken from Statistics Canada as well, and then
converted to USD by multiplying the GDP value by the purchasing power parity value
between the USD and the Canadian dollar. To then calculate the metropolitan are per-capita
income, the metro area GDP was divided by the metro area population. Additionally,
various other data such as historical purchase data and prices, relocation dates, venue
changes, and others were collected from the affiliated websites for each of the four leagues,
their corresponding hall of fame web pages, and Wikipedia.
I added other variables that were thought to potentially be correlated with a rise in franchise
values were added to the dataset for regression analysis as well. MetroTeams accounts for
multiple teams across the four leagues belonging to the same metro area, and is assigned a
value, 1-9, based on the total number of teams in that area. Similarly, MetroTeamsSame is
assigned a value 1-3 to tell whether there are multiple teams from the same league in the
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same metropolitan area.6 YrPurchased indicated the last year in which a team was
purchased, and PricePaid tells how much that team was sold for. These variables are
especially useful in comparing recent real transaction prices to estimated values for further
analysis. The venue variables, VenueYrOpened, VenueCap, and VenueCost correspond to
the when a team opened (or renovated) a venue, how many people it holds, and how much
that team spent on the construction. Additionally, the venue dummy variable implies
0=same venue, 1=renovation/reconstruction in that year, 2=new venue in that year. If
construction occurred in an odd year, it is counted as the next even year, and for this
analysis, since naming rights are not a measure of market being studied, venue name is
only changed if the entire venue changed, not just if the sponsorship naming rights
changed. FranchStartYr and FranchCurLocYr provide information on the age of the
franchise and if that team relocated to the metropolitan area in which they currently reside.
League dummy variables were created to show that holding all else constant, changes in
the value of one league do not correspond to exactly the same changes in another league.
For each league’s dummy, its value=1, or else the value=0. Lastly, a country dummy
variable was created to control for the national location of a team, with 0=U.S. and
1=Canada.
Section 4.4: Specific Metropolitan Area and Other Notes from Final Dataset
For clarification and continuity purposes, there are some specific metropolitan area
factors to note from the final dataset that could have an impact on the regression results.
The Rams moves from St. Louis to Los Angeles for the 2016 season, which is indicated by

6

Only one league/metropolitan area has 3 teams associated with it: NHL/New York,
which includes the New York Islanders, New York Rangers, and New Jersey Devils
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a change in the metropolitan area variables between the 2014 and 2016 data. San Francisco,
Oakland, and Golden State teams have all been included under the same metropolitan area
for all of those data observations, as well as Los Angeles and Anaheim being considered
from the same metropolitan area. The Raiders are considered from Oakland for all data
since they did not move to Las Vegas until the 2017 season7. The Current Location variable
is defined at the metro area name, and not necessarily the location of the stadium or venue
that the team plays in. The Florida Panthers are based in the Miami metro area. All teams
in Arizona are based in the Phoenix metro area, while all teams in Colorado are based in
the Denver metro area. The Indiana Pacers are considered from Indianapolis, the Carolina
Panthers from Charlotte, but the Carolina Hurricanes from Raleigh. The Texas Rangers are
grouped with all of the Dallas teams, the New England Patriots with all of the Boston
teams, and the Tennessee Titans with the Nashville teams. The Utah Jazz are considered
to be from Salt Lake City.
Figure 11 beow lists all of the professional sports teams that have been sold over
the last decade, as well as corresponding estimated value for that sale year, real transaction
price, and the difference in value between the two. Given the relatively wide range of
differences in value between estimation and sale across the four leagues, it is fair to make
a few assumptions about the buyer’s investment decision-making process, and how these
decisions may have affected the overall market. First, it is fair to assume that, on average,
investors have the necessary tools and data to determine the estimated value of the team
prior to purchase, and thus will pay not beyond what economic theory would suggest as

7

And 1995 for year in current location since they moved to Los Angeles for 15 years
from 1980-1995
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Section 4.5: Comparison of Estimated Values vs. Real Transaction Prices
Figure 11: Estimated vs. Real Value Differences since 20088
Team
Los Angeles Clippers
Golden State Warriors
Brooklyn Nets
Toronto Raptors
Washington Wizards
Sacramento Kings
Detroit Pistons
Atlanta Hawks
Memphis Grizzlies
Charlotte Hornets
Philadelphia 76ers
Milwaukee Bucks
New Orleans Pelicans
Los Angeles Dodgers
Chicago Cubs
Texas Rangers
Houston Astros
San Diego Padres
St. Louis Rams
Miami Dolphins
Jacksonville Jaguars
Cleveland Browns
Buffalo Bills
Montreal Canadians
Toronto Maple Leafs
Dallas Stars
Edmonton Oilers
Minnesota Wild
New York Islanders
8

League
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
NBA
MLB
MLB
MLB
MLB
MLB
NFL
NFL
NFL
NFL
NFL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL

Year Sold
2016
2010
2010
2012
2010
2013
2011
2015
2012
2010
2011
2014
2012
2012
2009
2010
2011
2012
2010
2008
2012
2012
2014
2009
2012
2011
2008
2008
2016

EV ($M)
$2,000
$315
$269
$382
$313
$525
$360
$825
$269
$278
$330
$405
$285
$1,401
$700
$451
$474
$458
$779
$1,044
$770
$987
$935
$339
$1,000
$230
$175
$217
$385

Sale Price ($M)
$2,000
$450
$365
$400
$551
$534
$325
$730
$377
$175
$287
$550
$340
$2,000
$700
$593
$465
$600
$750
$1,100
$770
$987
$1,400
$575
$1,000
$240
$170
$225
$485

For teams sold in odd years, estimated value was found on Forbes.com
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Value Difference ($M)
$0
-$135
-$96
-$18
-$238
-$9
$35
$95
-$108
$103
$43
-$145
-$55
-$599
$0
-$142
$9
-$142
$29
-$56
$0
$0
-$465
-$236
$0
-$10
$5
-$8
-$100

Winnipeg Jets
New Jersey Devils
St Louis Blues
Tampa Bay Lightning
Buffalo Sabres
Arizona Coyotes
Florida Panthers

NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL
NHL

2011
2013
2012
2010
2011
2014
2013

$164
$320
$130
$145
$173
$225
$240

$170
$320
$180
$93
$165
$305
$160

-$6
$0
-$50
$52
$8
-$80
$80

fair value market price. This is in fact somewhat true, as the average buyer paid about $62
million above estimated value at year of purchase.9 While $62 may seem like a large
amount, it is small compared to teams now valued at and selling for over a billion dollars.
Second, it is also fair to assume that transactions in which the buyer paid far beyond the
estimated value10 were done so as a response to prior transactions in that respective league
as well as hedging a bet that values would continue to rise over the long-term and turn it
into a positive investment (which recent data would confirm was a good bet). Lastly, a
large portion of the teams that sold below their estimated value are from small metropolitan
areas11, meaning their potential for future growth is much more limited compared to that
of a team from a large city such as New York or Los Angeles.
Section 4.6: Descriptive Statistics Table
Table 1 below gives the unit, mean, and standard deviation for all 25 variables used
in the regression analysis to follow.

9

Calculated as a total value difference of $2,339 million/36 teams sold
Examples include Washington Wizards (2010), Los Angeles Dodgers (2012) and
Buffalo Bills (2014)
11
Examples include Atlanta Hawks, Charlotte Hornets, Florida Panthers
10
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable
Team Value
Revenue
OpInc
WtpCost
PlayerExp
MetroPop
MetroGDP
MetroInc
MetroTeams
MetroTeamsSame
YrPurchased
VenueYrOpened
VenueCap
VenueCost
VenueD
CountryD
FranchStartYr
FranchCurLocYr
NBAD
NFLD
NHLD
MLB2016
NBA2016
NFL2016
NHL2016

Unit
$M
$M
$M
#
$M
M
USD
USD
#
#
Year
Year
#
$M
#
#
Year
Year
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

Mean
777.71
191.50
22.91
100.01
101.68
5.45
328680.80
58473.76
3.59
1.20
1993.44
1995.96
38606.60
271.53
0.06
0.07
1957.34
1966.25
0.246
0.262
0.250
0.049
0.049
0.053
0.049

Std. Dev
619.16
90.02
34.70
36.47
43.97
4.95
324494.70
11917.79
2.06
0.46
19.08
14.33
22437.78
240.58
0.31
0.26
32.29
30.06
0.431
0.440
0.431
0.216
0.216
0.223
0.216

CHAPTER FIVE
REGRESSION RESULTS
The following regressions and accompanying results will answer the proposed
question of how market demographics and financial statistical can be determinants of the
large rise in sports franchise values over the last decade. The dependent variable used in
the regression analysis will be the estimated franchise value for a specific year (or range of
years) as calculated by Forbes. The independent variables for this analysis will mostly
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include the financial data provided by Forbes and relevant metropolitan area statistics, with
other venue and team history factors used to provide additional information. The first
regression, which looks at the effects of different metro area variables on team value, will
be used as a comparison to previous studies conducted by economists on this subject. That
will then be followed by a regression with strictly financial data obtained from Forbes,
which represents the new aspect to this study as most other researchers did not have access
to such data at the time of their studies. The third regression will combine both the metro
area and financial data in order to see if the existence of variables in one category makes
those in the other more or less significant. After that, a fourth regression will be run using
all of the variables collected for the complete analysis of this study, such as team history
and venue data. Even previously insignificant variables will be included in order to view
the significance of the entire dataset as a whole. This regression will also act as the basis
for the final regression, which will test the correlation of only the previously significant
variables. All of the following regressions will have five other variables in common:
@trend, year=2016, nbad, nfld, and nhld. The league dummy variables control for the fact
that some leagues might be more popular than others, or perhaps more expensive. The
year=2016 variable looks for the bubble in 2016, as shown in the background section for
three of the four leagues, while the trend term is there to show that the bubble will not be
found just because values are rising steadily over time. Additionally, one other regression
will show the importance of the interaction terms for each league in regards to the franchise
value bubble in 2016, which was more broadly defined in the first five regressions as the
variable year=2016.
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Section 5.1: Metropolitan Area Regression Results
Equation 1 regresses franchise value on metropolitan area demographics.
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9
∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽=
∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 +∗ 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀
The results from this first regression equation can be seen in Table 2 below.
With t-statistics of -5.29 and 3.61 respectively, metroteamssame and metroGDP are the
only two metro area demographic variables that are statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level. A coefficient of -266 implies that having multiple teams in the same
metro area in the same league leads to a decrease in team value of around $266 million
for each franchise. This makes sense theoretically as multiple teams will be competing
for fans, players, and other sources of value that would otherwise be consumed by only
one team in a different scenario. As one would expect, increased competition leads to a
lower overall valuation as it decreases profits, ticket prices, and TV revenues, among
Table 2: Metropolitan Area Regression
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

METROPOP
METROINC
METROGDP
METROTEAMS
METROTEAMSSAME
C
@TREND
YEAR=2016
NBAD
NHLD
NFLD

-29.91507
0.001974
0.001289
-7.936334
-266.2864
444.3843
79.58225
473.0842
-136.9350
-383.2890
678.7132

23.16639
0.001681
0.000357
16.22787
50.29895
117.7996
13.34464
46.01912
37.68255
37.72375
36.90319

-1.291313
1.174311
3.615587
-0.489056
-5.294075
3.772377
5.963613
10.28017
-3.633910
-10.16042
18.39172

0.1971
0.2407
0.0003
0.6250
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.735111
0.730689
321.3156

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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61842969
166.2328
0.593700

other things. Additionally, while metroGDP is significant and positively correlated, it has
a very minimal effect on team value as a $1 increase in GDP leads to only a $1,300 increase
in value. One variable that is not statistically significant but is interesting to note is that of
metroteams. One would expect that having another team in the same metropolitan area but
in a different sport would matter by bringing in more fans and revenue in general, but in
this regression that is not the case. The trend and year variables are both statistically
significant, implying that (1) there is an overall upward trend in team value over this tenyear time period (as expected), and (2) that there is a substantial spike in values between
2014-2016, which will be discussed in more detail in later regressions. The dummy
variables are also statistically significant here, indicating that the value rise in teams from
each sport are all independent of each other. Lastly, an R-squared value of 0.73 signifies
that the independent variables, in general, are decently well-correlated to the dependent
variable.
Additionally, the results from this regression compare interestingly to those of
previous analyses performed by economists on this topic. Most previous authors measured
market size are metropolitan area population, which in this regression is insignificant, but
will become significant in later regressions. This would support findings by both Alexander
and Kern (2004) and Miller (2007) that suggest the size of the market, which can lead to
many other changes, does have an impact on team value. However, beyond this many
authors failed to examine the effects of metropolitan market measured as GDP or per capita
income, multiple teams in the same market, or even the same market and the same league,
which the rest of this analysis will dive into a bit further.
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Section 5.2: Financial Data Regression Results
The second regression estimating the impact of financial data on franchise value
can be written as Equation 2:
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝
+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑
+𝜀
The results from this second regression can be seen in Table 3 below.
In terms of the financial data variables, revenue is the only statistically significant
one that has an impact on team value. A coefficient of 6.9 implies that a $1 million rise in
revenue corresponds to a $6.9 million increase in franchise valuation. Although the other
three financial variables are insignificant, their coefficient signs are interesting to
decipher as well. Holding all else constant, a higher operating income would lead to a
decrease in franchise value of about $180,000. However, this is a bit surprising as one
would expect more income to increase value, even if revenue does not change. Likewise,
Table 3: Financial Data Regression
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

REVENUE
OPINC
WTPCOST
PLAYEREXP
C
@TREND
YEAR=2016
NHLD
NBAD
NFLD

6.901559
-0.179857
-0.229019
-1.158843
-685.6629
-4.716575
317.6174
298.4850
376.8908
253.3025

0.496529
0.665891
0.213455
0.811176
50.17387
8.032243
27.13320
29.89860
26.88719
26.88991

13.89961
-0.270099
-1.072916
-1.428596
-13.66574
-0.587205
11.70586
9.983244
14.01748
9.419983

0.0000
0.7872
0.2837
0.1536
0.0000
0.5573
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.912247
0.910931
184.7855

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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20487404
693.0451
1.277253

the two cost variables – win-to-player cost and player expenses, both exhibit a negative
relationship with team value. The negative coefficient on win-to-player cost implies that
more wins per player payroll leads to a decrease in value. In the same sense, the negative
beta on player expenses signifies the effect of spending more on players while holding
revenue constant. As such, one would expect franchise values to decrease if strictly costs
rise, but in this case that value is insignificant. However, the extra costs in both scenarios
are recaptured by more value being given back to the franchise in terms of wins and
popularity since better players are typically more expensive. While the trend variable is not
significant (and is also negative) in this regression compared to the previous estimation, a
bubble in 2016 still exists. Holding financials constant, team values are $317 million higher
in 2016 than in other years. Additionally, compared to the previous regression in which the
coefficients for the NBA and BFL dummy variables were negative and significant, here all
three leagues are positive and high significant. Lastly, an R-squared value of 0.91
compared to 0.73 implies much better correlation between the dependent and independent
variables when using financial data rather than metropolitan area demographics.
Section 5.3: Financial/Metro Combined Regression Results
The third regression looking at the impact of both financial data and metropolitan
area demographics on franchise value can be estimated as Equation 3:
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝
+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽C
∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽-∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽-6 ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-9 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀
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The results from the combined financial data/metropolitan area regression can be seen
here in Table 4.
In combining the metro area and financial data, revenue is the most statistically
significant variable, albeit now with a lower coefficient of 5.68 compared to 6.90 before.
An extra $1 million of annual revenue raises team value by $5.68 million, on average. As
in the previous regression, the other three financial variables remain insignificant.
However, holding everything else constant, opinc and playerexp now exhibit positive
coefficients, which would support that theories that higher income as well as spending
more on better players would result in more wins, and thus a higher overall value.
Metropop and metroGDP are both statistically significant now, though having multiple
teams from the same league in the same metropolitan area is not. Every additional 1
million people in a metropolitan area causes team value to decrease by $33 million,
Table 4: Combined Financial Data/Metropolitan Area Regression
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

REVENUE
OPINC
WTPCOST
PLAYEREXP
METROPOP
METROINC
METROGDP
METROTEAMS
METROTEAMSSAME
C
@TREND
YEAR=2016
NBAD
NFLD
NHLD

5.684286
0.930116
-0.167591
0.044011
-33.65539
-0.000473
0.000666
6.925519
-53.05130
-560.9873
-2.648321
321.0383
334.7420
263.9292
248.2269

0.533763
0.685860
0.208467
0.828362
13.15047
0.000956
0.000205
9.131232
29.26173
81.51870
8.013926
26.45309
27.67817
26.87076
31.00651

10.64945
1.356130
-0.803921
0.053130
-2.559254
-0.494423
3.253711
0.758443
-1.812993
-6.881701
-0.330465
12.13614
12.09408
9.822172
8.005637

0.0000
0.1756
0.4218
0.9576
0.0107
0.6212
0.0012
0.4485
0.0703
0.0000
0.7412
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.917412
0.915469
180.0166

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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19281564
472.1046
1.324399

which supports the idea that more people does not necessarily mean a higher value – those
people must be attracted by a winning team, or other external factors. Additionally, a $1000
increase in metro area GDP results in only a $666 increase in team value. While significant,
this value is almost negligent. The year and dummy variables remain highly significant and
contribute substantially to increased valuations, further supporting the possibility of some
other outside factor contributing to the large rise seen over the last decade. The year=2016
variable supports the idea of a $321 million rise in team value, on average, between 2014
and 2016. Lastly, an increase in R2 from 0.912 to only 0.917 between the previous
regression and this estimation raises the correlation value between the independent and
dependent variables only trivially, thus suggesting that most of the variation in the model
is driven by the statistically significant financial variables.
Section 5.4: Regression Using all Statistical Variables
In order to test the viability of all the variables from the dataset that have 5 years’
worth of observations, and subsequently determine which ones are viable for a “final”
regression, a fourth equation estimated as Equation 4 and the corresponding regression
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝
+ 𝛽; ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽= ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽C
∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽-∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽-6 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽-9
∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑦𝑟 + 𝛽-; ∗ 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑟 + 𝛽-< ∗ 𝑦𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽-=
∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽-C ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽-E ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑 + 𝛽2+ ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽2∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽22 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀
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results in Table 5 can be seen below.
As expected, most of the other variables under the venue and franchise history
categories added to this regression and not seen in any previous regression are insignificant
with the exception of one: venueyropened. The implications for this variable state that,
holding all else constant, for every year older a team’s venue is, its overall value decreases
by about $2 million. This makes sense theoretically and is supported by previous research
in this subject, in which both cases newer venues tend to increase value by attracting more
fans and better talent, while older venues (or as venues age without receiving significant
upgrades) with worse facilities will lead to a decrease in value. However, it is also
Table 5: All Variables Regression
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

REVENUE
OPINC
WTPCOST
PLAYEREXP
METROPOP
METROINC
METROGDP
METROTEAMS
METROTEAMSSAME
VENUECAP
VENUECOST
VENUED
VENUEYROPENED
FRANCHCURLOCYR
FRANCHSTARTYR
YRPURCHASED
@TREND
YEAR=2016
COUNTRYD
NBAD
NFLD
NHLD
C

6.080535
0.599888
-0.147999
-0.619150
-39.68089
-0.000870
0.000798
1.794721
-70.79475
-0.001165
0.008474
43.01403
-2.007373
0.634560
-0.561133
-0.498056
-1.732899
319.1849
-16.68777
314.1889
290.7501
236.4433
4379.383

0.551030
0.695888
0.213432
0.852670
13.75140
0.000983
0.000218
9.873663
30.54979
0.001609
0.055351
26.55857
0.689503
0.439965
0.444401
0.489959
8.119632
26.45458
33.47822
46.71182
50.44577
48.22683
1676.448

11.03485
0.862047
-0.693421
-0.726130
-2.885588
-0.885186
3.660146
0.181769
-2.317357
-0.724035
0.153099
1.619592
-2.911332
1.442294
-1.262673
-1.016527
-0.213421
12.06539
-0.498467
6.726111
5.763617
4.902734
2.612299

0.0000
0.3890
0.4883
0.4680
0.0041
0.3764
0.0003
0.8558
0.0208
0.4693
0.8784
0.1059
0.0037
0.1498
0.2072
0.3098
0.8311
0.0000
0.6183
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0092

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.919582
0.916568
178.8431

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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18775119
305.1055
1.349812

important to note that in some cases historical value of a venue might actually increase a
team’s value (e.g. Fenway Park, Wrigley Field), though that significance goes largely
uncaptured in this study except for the venue dummy variable. Even though it is
insignificant in this regression, the venue dummy variable places a large value on a new
venue (2), a medium value for a venue that was renovated sometime over this ten-year time
period (1 – Madison Square Garden), and no value (0) for any team whose venue has not
changed at all. Besides the year in which a venue was opened or renovated, theory and
research support the fact that historical date variables do not have much impact on current
data. As such, this leaves revenue, metropop, metrogdp, metroteamssame, year=2016, and
the league dummy variables – along with venureyropened – as statistically significant for
the final regression.
In order to determine that the rest of the variables from this regression were
acceptable to drop for the final regression, performing an F-test will show that these
variables are collectively insignificant. The results from this test can be seen in Table 6
below. Given that the F value of 1.29 is less than the critical value of 1.73, it is acceptable
Table 6: All Variable Regression to Final Regression F-test
Measure
SSR-R
SSR-UR
N
K-R
K-UR
F
P
CV

Value
19312701
18775119
610
10
23
1.29287569
0.212142345
1.736843013
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to drop all of the statistically insignificant variables from Equation 4 above in order to
produce an adequately refined regression model that can be seen in Equation 5 to follow.
Section 5.5: Statistically Significant Regression Results
Paring down the results from the previous regression containing all of the variables,
one last regression was run using only those that were statistically significant in order to
determine which factors can be attributed to the rise in franchise values over the last decade.
The estimated equation can be seen at Equation 5 below, with the accompanying regression
to follow in Table 7.
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9
∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016 + 𝛽=
∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝜀
As expected, all of the variables in the final regression are significant at the 95%
confidence level. Revenue represents the most strongly correlated variable with team value,
Table 7: Final Regression with Only Statistically Significant Variables
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

REVENUE
METROPOP
METROGDP
METROTEAMSSAME
VENUEYROPENED
YEAR=2016
NBAD
NFLD
NHLD
C

6.060637
-31.04548
0.000661
-60.24441
-1.418480
312.7068
364.8105
272.6627
281.8866
2178.750

0.159865
8.808430
0.000140
28.73619
0.523988
20.75446
24.75419
23.11592
27.07524
1048.626

37.91098
-3.524520
4.725345
-2.096465
-2.707088
15.06697
14.73732
11.79545
10.41123
2.077719

0.0000
0.0005
0.0000
0.0365
0.0070
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0382

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.917279
0.916038
179.4097

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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19312701
739.2549
1.332012

as a $1 million increase in revenue leads to a $6.1 million rise in team value. Although one
would expect metropolitan population to have a positive coefficient, here it is negative.
This implies that for every additional 1 million people in a metro area, team values fall by
about $31 million. Having multiple teams from the same league in the same metro area is
also negatively correlated, though this was expected as competition will force fans to
choose a team, which, in theory, will drive down income, revenue, and overall value. Here,
every additional team subtracts about $60 million from estimated value of each team in
that same league and area. The year in which a venue opened is also negatively correlated
with team value, exhibiting a decrease of $1.5 million for every additional year that a venue
ages. While metropolitan area GDP is positively significant, the coefficient value is almost
negligible. A $1,000 rise in GDP only increases team value by about $660. The league
dummy variables are all highly significant with large coefficients as well, further
supporting previous evidence that the rise in team value in each league is independent in
terms of popularity, cost, or other factors. As for the year=2016 variable seen in all five
regressions, the high coefficient value associated with the variable and its strong
significance presents a more interesting case as to the exact causes of the recent spike in
franchise values. In this regression, the coefficient of 312 corresponds to a rise in team
value, on average, of $312 million between 2014-2016. One economic theory that could
help explain this spike is that of the economic bubble theory. Clearly since 2014 there has
been an irrational rise in values lying far outside the “true” range of asset values throughout
the professional sports industry, although less-so in the NHL than in the other three leagues.
The existence of this trend term helps control for the fact that assets such as professional
sports franchises have a long history of increases in value, but cannot act as a 20- or 30-
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year bubble because bubbles do not last that long. As such, this variable provides evidence
that team values grew even above the trend in 2016. Part of this bubble can also be
explained by the mirrored rise in TV and broadcasting revenue – a major source of revenue
for the leagues as a whole and teams individually. Big market teams such as New York and
Los Angeles will reap the rewards of large contracts, while smaller-market teams still
benefit through league revenue-sharing models. Another contributing factor lies in the
combination of interest in professional sports, especially as a long term investment, and a
lack of supply since teams rarely hit the market.
Section 5.6: 2016 Bubble Regression
Given that the year=2016 variable showed a large and statistically significant spike
in franchise values for all of the previous regressions, further analysis aimed to investigate
whether this phenomenon occurred in all four sports leagues between 2014-2016, and if
so, which leagues were impacted more than others, holding all else constant. In order to
estimate that impact, four interaction terms that define teams in each league based strictly
on 2016 values were added to the final regression estimation (except for the year=2016
term), as seen in Equation 6 below.
𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑑𝑝 + 𝛽9
∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽< ∗ 𝑚𝑙𝑏2+-< + 𝛽=
∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽C ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽E ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽-+ ∗ 𝑛𝑓𝑙_2016 + 𝛽-- ∗ 𝑛𝑏𝑎_2016
+ 𝛽-2 ∗ 𝑛ℎ𝑙_2016 + 𝜀
Table 8 shows the corresponding results.
As the results from the below regression show, large and significant bubbles were present
in the MLB, NFL, and NBA for 2016, while a relatively small and insignificant rise existed
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in the NHL. MLB teams averages a rise in value of about $251 million between 2014-2016,
while NFL team values rose about $490 million, and NBA team values an astounding $548
million over that same time period. Meanwhile, NHL teams averaged only about an $11
million increase in team value during this two-year timeframe – a small enough increase
that it was not significant in regards to the theory of an economic bubble. The remainder
of the variables were relatively unaffected in coefficient value or sign even when adding
these interaction terms, indicating that, all else constant, they are all still significant for
both the 2014-2016 bubble as well as the entire 10-year period analyzed in this study.
An F-test was also performed to show that, in contrast to the previous test where it
was acceptable to drop all of the insignificant variables from the “all” to “final” regression,
here none of the variables between the 2016 bubble regression and final regression can be
Table 8: 2016 Bubble Regression
Dependent Variable: TEAMVALUE
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 610
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

REVENUE
METROPOP
METROGDP
METROTEAMSSAME
VENUEYROPENED
MLB_2016
NFLD
NBAD
NHLD
NFL_2016
NBA_2016
NHL_2016
C

5.787318
-35.53321
0.000759
-70.76478
-1.475897
251.5094
242.9708
283.0595
300.4416
489.3740
548.3236
11.06986
2370.940

0.148359
7.812326
0.000125
25.46535
0.463686
33.95766
21.99456
23.55686
25.33241
35.47452
32.91345
32.77372
928.3333

39.00881
-4.548352
6.094275
-2.778866
-3.182965
7.406558
11.04686
12.01601
11.85997
13.79508
16.65956
0.337766
2.553975

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0056
0.0015
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.7357
0.0109

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.935634
0.934340
158.6554

Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Durbin-Watson stat
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15027401
723.1730
1.284077

Table 9: 2016 Bubble Regression to Final Regression F-test
Measure
SSR-R
SSR-UR
N
K-R
K-UR
F
P
CV

Value
19312701
15027401
610
10
13
56.74798323
2.7654E-32
2.619828457

dropped. In comparison to the previous F-test that produced an acceptable result, here an
F-value of 56.74 that is much larger than the critical value of 2.61 implies that it is not
acceptable to think that the bubble is the same in all of the leagues. This result of this test
does, in fact, support the regression results from Table 8 as a bubble only exists in 3 out of
the 4 leagues, and the coefficient value for each of the league_2016 variables exhibit a
different value increase during this year.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Section 6.1: Summary of Findings
As a result of this study, I discovered that revenue, metropolitan area population
and GDP, the year that a venue was opened or renovated, and having multiple teams in the
same metropolitan area are all correlated with team franchise value. Revenue and metro
are GDP were both positively correlated, as expected, while venue year, same metropolitan
area/teams, and metro area population were all negatively correlated – the former two
which were expected while the latter was not. More specifically, these results answer the
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question of how financial data can be an indicator of the recent spike in franchise
valuations, with revenue increases acting as the main driver. One of the major reasons
behind the recent rise in revenues that will continue into the foreseeable future is the rights
fees to televise live sporting events (Adgate 2018). Despite declining television ratings,
analysts expect media rights to surpass gate receipts as the largest source of revenue during
this current year, with the rise of streaming services helping to offset this decline in TV
viewership. Additionally, and potentially much more interesting in terms of the economics
behind these results, the regression analysis supported the previously stated background
information that the rise in team values suggests some type of economic bubble in
professional sports valuations since 2014. On average, franchises from the four major
sports leagues rose by $316 million between 2014-2016. However, as seen in the final
regression looking at the size of the bubble in each league specifically for 2016, the value
presents a much wider range of results. NHL teams rose by only $11 million on average –
not exhibiting any bubble at all – while MLB teams rose $251 million, NFL teams $490
million, and NBA teams $548 million on average. Clearly, the factors affecting each league
cause them to act independently of one another. While there are potentially many different
explanations behind the growth of this bubble, given the formation and exclusivity of the
professional sports industry, it does not seem to be in danger of bursting anytime soon like
previous economic bubbles such as the dotcom boom, and more recently, the housing
crisis.
Section 6.2: Suggestions for Future Research
Given additional time and resources, it is interesting to consider how this study can
be improved upon in future research. In looking at the slopes of the lines for the background
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graphs in Chapter 2, one could hypothesize that bubble started between 2012-2014 rather
than 2014-2016 – at least for teams in the NBA and NHL. Testing this hypothesis using a
year=2014 variable could provide further insight into both the factors contributing to the
bubble as well as potentially how long the bubble might last considering that bubbles
typically do not exist for more than a decade at most. Further evidence that supports this
bubble theory recently became available with the release that every NBA team is now
worth at least $1 billion as of 2018, which continues the sharp rise in values since 2014.
This represents a 22% rise year-over-year, with the largest driving forced being the league’s
international growth prospects (Badenhausen, 2018). Not only has the influx of
international talent from Europe and elsewhere broadened the NBA’s appeal, but so has the
league’s investment in itself by playing games in other countries and forming NBA China
– a development program in one of the world’s largest markets. It is arguable that the NBA
now has the greatest international appeal of all four major North American sports leagues.
Additionally, domestic growth has surged with a new TV broadcasting deals set to begin,
the ability to advertise on uniforms, and an overall increase in merchandise sales. However,
the regressions in this study control for revenue from these and other sources, meaning
these factors are likely causing the rise in the revenue variable but not in the bubble, unless
they are having some type of speculative effect that is unsustainable in the long run.
As a result of this study, it is interesting to consider how estimated franchise values
as well as real transaction prices will continue this upward trend in the coming years, and
at what pace they will do so. While revenue is certainly a strong variable to use in
forecasting the future, there must be other explanations as well. Beyond the variables used
in this analysis, another possibility for future study based on these recent findings could be
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the impact of outside factors such as broadcasting-specific revenue variables and
international attraction on team value, potentially measured in viewership or otherwise.
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